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REVIVING THE MODERN RULE IN THE 
INTERPRETATION OF TAX STATUTES: BABY STEPS 
TAKEN IN CANADA TRUSTCO, MATHEW, PLACER 
DOME AND IMPERIAL OIL 
 
Jinyan Li and David Piccolo* 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
In 2005, the Supreme Court of Canada made two landmark tax decisions: 
Canada Trustco Mortgage Co. v. Canada1 and Mathew v. Canada.2  For 
the first time, the Court ruled on the application of the general anti-
avoidance rule (GAAR) and articulated a uniform approach to statutory 
interpretation on the basis of the “modern rule” – the “textual, contextual 
and purposive” (TCP) approach. The far-reaching implications of these 
decisions in GAAR jurisprudence have been well discussed elsewhere.3 
                                                 
* Jinyan Li is a Professor at Osgoode Hall Law School, email: 
jinyanli@osgoode.yorku.ca; David Piccolo is an LL.B. Candidate at Osgoode Hall Law 
School, email davidpiccolo@osgoode.yorku.ca 
1 2005 SCC 54 [Canada Trustco]. 
2 2005 SCC 55 [Mathew].  This case and Canada Trustco, ibid., were heard together. 
3 See Benjamin Alarie, Sanjana Bhatia & David G. Duff, “Symposium on Tax Avoidance 
After Canada Trustco and Mathew: Summary of Proceedings” (2005) 53 Can. Tax. J. 
1010; Brian Arnold, “Confusion Worse Confounded – The Supreme Court’s GAAR 
Decisions” (2006) 54 Can. Tax. J. 167 (hereinafter “Arnold, “Confusion Worse 
Confounded”); --, “The Long, Slow, Steady Demise of the General Anti-Avoidance 
Rule” (2004) 52 Can. Tax. J. 488; --, “Reflections on the Relationship between Statutory 
Interpretation and Tax Avoidance” (2001) 49 Can. Tax. J. 1; Patrick J. Boyle, William I. 
Innes & Joel Nitikman, The Essential GAAR Manual: Policies, Principles and 
Procedures (Toronto: CCH Canadian, 2006); David G. Duff & Harry Erlichman, eds., 
Tax Avoidance in Canada after Canada Trustco and Mathew, (Toronto: Irvin Law, 
2007); Malcolm Gammie, “Barclays and Canada Trustco: Further Comment from a UK 
Perspective” (2005) 53 Can. Tax. J. 1047; Thomas E. McDonnell, “Restrictive View of 
Avoidance Transaction and Abusive Avoidance: Evans v. The Queen” (2006) Can. Tax. 
J. 461; Alan M. Schwartz, ed., GAAR interpreted: the general anti-avoidance rule 
(Toronto: Carswell, 2006). 
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This article focuses on the importance of these decisions in statutory 
interpretation. Although it was unclear whether the TCP approach was 
limited to the GAAR, these two decisions represented a shift away from 
the literal or plain meaning approach towards a revival of the modern rule 
in the interpretation of the Income Tax Act (the “Act”).4    
 
By coincidence, the Court had two more opportunities to revisit the issue 
of statutory interpretation in 2006.  Placer Dome Canada Ltd. v. Ontario 
(Minister of Finance) 5 made it clear that the TCP approach applies to tax 
statutes in general, including provincial tax statutes. In Imperial Oil Ltd. v. 
Canada,6 the Court further confirmed the application of the TCP 
approach, even when it was split on its application to the facts of the case. 
 
This article critically assesses these four decisions in terms of their stance 
on statutory interpretation. Following this introduction, Part II provides a 
background for the shift and briefly overviews the rise and fall of the 
modern rule in Canadian tax jurisprudence.  Part III discusses Canada 
Trustco and Mathew and the Court’s thinking on the importance of the 
TCP approach and the guidelines on its application. Part IV reviews 
Placer Dome and examines the extent to which it advances the Court’s 
thinking on purposive interpretation. Part V reviews Imperial Oil and 
highlights the major differences between the majority and the dissenting 
justices on the relevance and proof of legislative purpose or intent. Part VI 
argues that the revival of the modern rule in the form of the TCP approach 
is encouraging, even though the steps taken thus far merely represent 
“baby steps”. There are strong signals that the Court will adhere to this 
approach. The article concludes with some thoughts on the challenges 
facing the courts in establishing the “purpose” of provisions of the Act and 
offers some suggestions for moving forward.   
 
 
                                                 
4 R.S.C. 1985 (5th Supp.), c. 1. 
5 2006 SCC 20 [Placer Dome]. 
6 2006 SCC 46 [Imperial Oil]. 
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II. THE RISE AND FALL OF THE “MODERN 
RULE” 
 
A. THE MODERN RULE 
 
The “modern rule” of statutory interpretation calls for “the words of an 
Act to be read in their entire context and in their grammatical and ordinary 
sense harmoniously with the scheme of the Act, the object of the Act, and 
the intention of parliament.”7  This requires an examination of the 
meaning of the words used in the statute, the context of the provision 
within the statute, the scheme and object of the statute, and the legislative 
intent.  It was adopted by the Supreme Court in Stubart Investments Ltd. v. 
Canada.8  This meant that tax statutes would be interpreted in the same 
manner as other statutes.9 
 
The modern rule was further entrenched when section 12 of the 
Interpretation Act10 was enacted.  It states that “every enactment is 
deemed remedial, and shall be given such fair, large and liberal 
construction and interpretation as best ensures the attainment of its 
objects.” 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
7 Elmer A. Dreidger, Construction of Statutes, 2nd ed. (Toronto: Butterworths, 1983) at 
87. 
8 [1984] 1 S.C.R. 536, [1984] C.T.C. 294, 84 D.T.C. 6305 [Stubart].  This case is known 
for its adoption of the modern rule of statutory interpretation as well as its rejection of the 
“business purpose” test as an anti-avoidance rule.  In response to the second element, 
Parliament enacted a statutory anti-avoidance rule or GAAR in section 245 of the Act. 
9 As discussed further, however, the Income Tax Act is still considered to be “different” 
from other statutes because of the inherent complexity and high level of technicality. 
10 R.S.C. 1985, c. I-21. 
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B. THE RISE 
 
Traditionally, Canadian courts interpreted tax statutes strictly.  This 
approach is perhaps best articulated in a dictum of the House of Lords in 
Partington v. A.G. (1869):11 
 
… as I understand the principle of all fiscal legislation, it is this: if the 
person sought to be taxed comes within the letter of the law he must 
be taxed, however great the hardship may appear to the judicial mind 
to be.  On the other hand, if the Crown, seeking to recover the tax, 
cannot bring the subject within the letter of the law, the subject is 
free, however apparently within the spirit of the law the case might 
otherwise appear to be. 
 
Under the strict approach, if the language of the statute is not literally apt 
to catch the transaction at issue, then it is not subject to the statute.  In 
other words, where there is doubt or ambiguity in the provisions that levy 
a tax, the ambiguity is interpreted in favour of the taxpayer.  This 
interpretative approach was instrumental to the success of tax planning.  
The rationale for strict interpretation has often been related to “notions of 
personal liberty”12 and the confiscation of property.13 
 
Canadian courts started to move away from the strict approach in the late 
1970s.14  The rise of the modern rule gained momentum with Stubart.  In 
                                                 
11 L.R. 4 H.L. 100 (H.L.), 122, per Lord Cairns. 
12 Randal N. Graham, Statutory Interpretation: Theory and Practice (Toronto: Emond 
Montgomery Publications, 2001) at 194. 
13 Robert Stevens, Law and Politics: The House of Lords as a Judicial Body, 1800-1976 
(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1978) at 170-71. 
14 For a general discussion of statutory interpretation, see Brian Arnold, “The Supreme 
Court and the Interpretation of Tax Statutes – Again” (2006) 54 Can. Tax. J. 677; -- 
“Confusion Worse Confounded”), supra note 3; -- “Statutory Interpretation: Some 
Thoughts on Plain Meaning”, Report of Proceedings of Fiftieth Tax Conference, 1998 
Tax Conference (Toronto: Canadian Tax Foundation, 1999) 6:1-36; David G. Duff, 
“Justice Iacobucci and the ‘Golden and Straight Metwand’ of Canadian Tax Law” (2007) 
57 U.T.L.J. 525; --, “Interpreting the Income Tax Act – Part 1: Interpretive Doctrines” 
(1999) 47 Can. Tax. J. 464; --, “Interpreting the Income Tax Act – Part 2: Toward a 
Pragmatic Approach” (1999) 47 Can. Tax. J. 741; David G. Duff et. al., Canadian 
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Stubart, the Court gave two justifications for the development.  First, the 
nature of the income tax laws had changed: “Income tax legislation, such 
as the federal Act in our country, is no longer a simple device to raise 
revenue to meet the cost of governing the community.  Income taxation is 
also employed by government to attain selected economic policy 
objectives.”15  Second, the modern rule is helpful to “reduce the attraction 
of elaborate and intricate tax avoidance plans.”16  Purposive interpretation 
was thus considered a tool to prevent tax avoidance.17 
 
Subsequent to the Stubart decision, the Court broke further away from the 
traditional strict approach.  For example, in Bronfman Trust v. The 
Queen18, the Court disallowed the taxpayer’s interest deduction because it 
was not used to earn income from business or property.  The Court 
rejected the taxpayer’s argument that the borrowed funds allowed the trust 
to indirectly earn income because to do so would open the availability of 
the deduction to a broader use than what was intended by Parliament.  The 
Chief Justice stated:19 
 
Parliament created subparagraph 20(1)(c)(i), and made it operate 
notwithstanding paragraph 18(1)(b), in order to encourage the 
accumulation of capital which would produce taxable income.  Not 
all borrowing expenses are deductible. 
 
                                                                                                                         
income tax law, 2nd ed. (Markham: Butterworths, 2006); Tim Edgar and Daniel Sandler, 
eds., Materials on Canadian Income Tax, 13th ed. (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2005); Peter 
Hogg, Joanne Magee & Jinyan Li, Principles of Canadian Income Tax Law, 5th ed. 
(Toronto: Thomson/Carswell, 2005), c. 19; Vern Krishna, The Fundamentals of 
Canadian income tax, 8th ed. (Toronto: Thomson/Carswell, 2004); Joel Nitikman and 
Derek Alty, “Some Thoughts on Statutory Interpretation in Canadian Tax Law – A Reply 
to Brian Arnold” (2000) 20 Tax Notes International 2185. 
15 Stubart, supra note 7 at 6322. 
16 Ibid., at 6322. 
17 Ibid., at 6322. 
18 [1987] 1 C.T.C. 117, 87 D.T.C. 5059 (S.C.C.). 
19 Ibid., at para. 28. 
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C. THE FALL 
 
In the early 1990s, the Court’s stance on statutory interpretation changed.  
The modern rule continued to be cited, but its impact was reduced 
significantly by the rise of the “plain meaning” approach.  One of the first 
cases to cause the fall of the modern rule is Antosko v. The Queen.20  The 
taxpayer purchased $5 million in debt from a provincial agency for $10 
and the promise to run a failing company for two years.  Interest income 
had accrued while the debt was in the provincial agency’s hands, and 
when it became payable, the taxpayer deducted the amount that had 
accrued in the agency’s hands under subsection 20(14) of the Act.  The 
deduction was authorized by the literal language of the Act, which 
provided that, on the transfer of a debt obligation, any unpaid interest 
accrued to the date of the transfer is to be included in the transferor’s 
income and deducted from the transferee’s income.  The transferor, being 
an agency of the provincial government, was exempt from tax so that it 
did not report or pay tax on the interest accrued up to the date of transfer.  
The Minister took the position that it was contrary to the object and spirit 
of the Act to allow the transferee taxpayer to deduct the accrued interest 
when the transferor was not taxable – essentially, the subsection designed 
to prevent double taxation was being used to create double non-taxation.  
The Court rejected the Minister’s argument and allowed the deduction.  
Iacobucci J., writing for the Court, held that the taxpayer was entitled to 
rely upon the terms of the statute, which clearly entitled the transferee of a 
debt obligation to a deduction for the interest accrued to the date of 
transfer.  Where the words of the statute were “clear and plain”, and where 
the legal and practical effect of the taxpayer’s transaction brought the 
taxpayer within the words of the statute, then the statute had to be applied 
according to its terms regardless of the object and purpose of the 
provision.21 
 
The Court’s decision in Friesen v. R22 moved further away from the 
modern rule.  The issue in this case was whether the taxpayer’s land was 
                                                 
20 [1994] 2 C.T.C. 25, 94 D.T.C. 6314 (S.C.C.). 
21 Ibid., at para. 25. 
22 [1995] 2 C.T.C. 369, 95 D.T.C. 5551 (S.C.C.) [Friesen]. 
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inventory for the purpose of subsection 10(1) of the Act – if the land was 
inventory, the taxpayer would be able to deduct the unrealized loss on the 
property.  The majority of the Court found that the land was inventory in 
subsection 248(1), and made it clear that the modern rule was falling out 
of favour: 
 
In interpreting sections of the Income Tax Act, the correct approach, 
as set out by Estey J. in Stubary Investments Ltd. v. The Queen, 
[1984] 1 S.C.R. 536, is to apply the plain meaning rule.23 
 
[T]he object and purpose of a provision need only be resorted to 
when the statutory language admits of some doubt or ambiguity.24 
 
The above statements indicate that the Court, in Friesen misinterpreted the 
modern rule as adopted in Stubart to be the same as the plain meaning 
rule.  That may explain why in subsequent cases25 the Court cited Stubart 
for establishing the modern rule as the proper approach of statutory 
interpretation, but paid lip service to it by giving a more literal 
interpretation of the statutory provisions and ignoring the “scheme of the 
Act, the object of the Act and the intention of Parliament.”  The Court 
dissected the modern rule into two parts.  Find the plain meaning of the 
statutory text first.  Only if that exercise fails in establishing an 
unambiguous interpretation may the court examine the “object or purpose” 
of the statutory provision.  The Court rationalized its approach on the 
following ground: 
 
It would introduce intolerable uncertainty into the Income Tax Act if 
clear language in a detailed provision of the Act were to be qualified 
by unexpressed exceptions derived from a court’s view of the object 
and purpose of the provision …26 
                                                 
23 Ibid., at para. 10. 
24 Ibid., at para. 60. 
25 See e.g. Ludco Enterprises Ltd. v. Canada, [2002] 1 C.T.C. 95, 2001 D.T.C. 5505 
(S.C.C.). 
26 See e.g. Friesen, supra note 22 at para. 11.  This quote originated from Peter Hogg’s 
lecture notes, which were incorporated into Hogg and Magee, Principles of Canadian 
Income Tax Law, 1st ed. (Toronto: Carswell, 1995) at 453-54. 
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III. CANADA TRUSTCO AND MATHEW: 
REVIVING THE MODERN RULE IN THE GAAR 
CONTEXT 
 
A. GAAR REQUIRES A PURPOSIVE INTERPRETATION 
 
As mentioned already, Canada Trustco and Mathew were the first GAAR 
cases heard by the Supreme Court.  Parliament enacted the GAAR (section 
245 of the Act) to prevent abusive tax avoidance transactions without 
interfering with legitimate tax planning.  Subsection 245(4) draws the line 
between legitimate and abusive tax avoidance by stating that GAAR does 
not apply to an avoidance transaction “where its may reasonably be 
considered that the transaction would not result directly or indirectly in a 
misuse of the provisions of this Act or an abuse having regard to the 
provisions of this Act, other than this section, read as a whole.”  What 
constitutes a “misuse” of the provisions of the Act or “abuse” of the 
provisions of the Act read as a whole? Obviously, the answer to these 
questions cannot be found by merely looking at the plain meaning of the 
provisions relied upon, or avoided by, the taxpayer in achieving tax 
avoidance.  If the taxpayer cannot rely on the plain meaning of the specific 
statutory provisions (including some specific anti-avoidance provisions), 
the Minister would not have to use “the ultimate weapon”27 to deny the tax 
benefit resulting from the avoidance transactions.  In order to give 
meaning to section 245, the court must look for something beyond the 
plain meaning of a statutory provision.  As such, the court must look at the 
purpose of the provision and the intent of Parliament in enacting it.  In 
other words, the modern rule is needed to interpret the GAAR.28 
 
                                                 
27 Hill v. Canada (2002), [2003] 4 C.T.C. 2548, 2002 D.T.C. 1749 (T.C.C.) at para. 63. 
28 In this sense, the GAAR could be viewed as a statutory interpreting rule to codify the 
modern rule. 
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Not surprisingly, the key issue in Canada Trustco and Mathew was the 
interpretation of subsection 245(4), that is, whether the transactions 
undertaken primarily for tax purposes were “abusive”.29  According to the 
Court, the doctrine of “abuse” refers to the abuse of the “object, spirit and 
purpose” of the legislation.  The process of determining “abuse” under 
subsection 245(4) involves two steps: first, interpret the provisions giving 
rise to the tax benefit to determine their object, spirit and purpose; second, 
determine whether the transaction falls within or frustrates that purpose.30 
 
B. CANADA TRUSTCO 
 
1. THE CASE 
 
Canada Trustco had a significant amount of income from a portfolio of 
loans and leases.  In order to minimize its tax liability, the taxpayer looked 
for tax structures that could shelter such income from tax.  The structure 
under appeal in this case involved a series of transactions that were, in 
essence, a purchase and lease-back transaction.  The goal was to generate 
“tax deductions” in excess of income so that the deduction could be used 
to shelter investment income. 
 
Canada Trustco purchased trailers from a third party and concurrently sub-
leased them back to the vendor.  On the same day, further back-to-back 
transactions were undertaken to ensure that the financial risk for all parties 
was eliminated.  As a result of these transactions, the positions of the 
parties involved were essentially unchanged with one major exception: 
technically, Canada Trustco had purchased the trailers (which are 
depreciable property and eligible for capital cost allowance deductions) 
and leased them back to the original “seller”.  Because the deductions 
exceeded the “lease income” during the first few years of the “lease”, the 
deductions effectively reduced income from the existing portfolio of loans 
                                                 
29 The Court collapsed the “misuse” and “abuse” elements into a single “abuse” test: 
Canada Trustco, supra note 1 at para. 43.  For more comments on this aspect of the 
decisions, see Arnold (2006), supra note 3 at 187-89. 
30 Canada Trustco, supra note 1 at para. 44. 
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and leases.  Mission accomplished!?  The CCA deductions were allowed 
by the language of paragraph 20(1)(a) of the Act and related Income Tax 
Regulations.  The Minister challenged the structure under the GAAR, 
alleging abuse of the “object, spirit and purpose” of these provisions. 
 
The taxpayer prevailed at the Tax Court of Canada and the Federal Court 
of Appeal.  At the Supreme Court, the Chief Justice and Major J. co-wrote 
the decision for a unanimous court, upholding the lower court decisions. 
 
2. INTERPRETATION PRINCIPLES 
 
With respect to statutory interpretation, the Court recognized the modern 
rule as follows:31 
 
It has been long established as a matter of statutory interpretation that 
"the words of an Act are to be read in their entire context and in their 
grammatical and ordinary sense harmoniously with the scheme of the 
Act, the object of the Act, and the intention of Parliament": see 65302 
British Columbia Ltd. v. Canada, [1999] 3 S.C.R. 804, at para. 50. 
The interpretation of a statutory provision must be made according to 
a textual, contextual and purposive analysis to find a meaning that is 
harmonious with the Act as a whole. 
 
The relative weight of the textual meaning, contextual meaning and 
legislative purpose in the interpretive process may vary according to the 
level of ambiguity of the provision:32 
 
When the words of a provision are precise and unequivocal, the 
ordinary meaning of the words play a dominant role in the 
interpretive process. On the other hand, where the words can support 
more than one reasonable meaning, the ordinary meaning of the 
words plays a lesser role. The relative effects of ordinary meaning, 
context and purpose on the interpretive process may vary, but in all 
                                                 
31 Canada Trustco, supra note 1 at para. 10. 
32 Ibid. 
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cases the court must seek to read the provisions of an Act as a 
harmonious whole. 
 
What separated the new TCP approach from the previous “plain meaning” 
approach was the Court’s emphasis that “in all cases the court must seek to 
read the provisions of an Act as a harmonious whole”.  Under the plain 
meaning approach, legislative purpose or intent was considered only in 
cases where the meaning is not clear. 
 
The Court again formally rejected traditional strict interpretation:33 
 
As a result of the Duke of Westminster principle (Commissioners of 
Inland Revenue v. Duke of Westminster, [1936] A.C. 1 (H.L.)) that 
taxpayers are entitled to arrange their affairs to minimize the amount 
of tax payable, Canadian tax legislation received a strict 
interpretation in an era of more literal statutory interpretation than the 
present. There is no doubt today that all statutes, including the Act, 
must be interpreted in a textual, contextual and purposive way. 
 
However, the legacy of the Duke of Westminster remains under the TCP 
approach: the particularity and detail of many tax provisions that often led 
to an emphasis on textual interpretation;34 and the provisions of the Act 
“must be interpreted in order to achieve consistency, predictability and 
fairness so that taxpayers may manager their affairs intelligently.”35 
 
Does the TCP apply to the interpretation of all provisions of the Act or 
only those relevant to the application of the Act?  The answer is unclear.  
The Court seemed to endorse the traditional strict interpretation outside 
the GAAR: “The Income Tax Act remains an instrument dominated by 
explicit provisions dictating specific consequences, inviting a largely 
textual interpretation.”36  To the extent that the GAAR applies, however, 
                                                 
33 Ibid., at para. 11. 
34 Ibid.  The Court repeated this in para. 13 that “The Income Tax Act remains an 
instrument dominated by explicit provisions dictating specific consequences, inviting a 
largely textual interpretation.” 
35 Ibid., at para. 12. 
36 Ibid., at para. 13. 
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“the Duke of Westminster principle and the emphasis on textual 
interpretation may be attenuated.”37 
 
According to the Court, its role is “to interpret and apply the Act as it was 
adopted by Parliament”.38  The Court acknowledged the tension between 
the GAAR and other provisions of the Act relevant to a particular 
transaction and appreciated the fact that it must, to the extent possible, 
contemporaneously give effect to both the GAAR and these other 
provisions.39  Had the Court viewed the TCP as a general interpretation 
principle, applicable to the interpretation of every provision of the Act, it 
might not have separated the statutory provisions into the two camps. 
 
3.  INTERPRETATION OF THE GAAR 
 
Even if it was unclear whether the TCP applies to the Act generally, it 
clearly applied in the GAAR context.  The Court accepted that the purpose 
of the GAAR is to deny the tax benefits of certain arrangements that 
comply with a literal interpretation of the provisions of the Act, but 
amount to an abuse of the provisions of the Act.40 
 
As mentioned above, the abuse analysis under subsection 245(4) is a two-
step process.  The first step is to find the object, spirit and purpose of the 
specific provision giving rise to the tax benefit; in Canada Trustco, it was 
paragraph 20(1)(a), which allows a deduction for capital cost allowance.  
The key term was “cost”.  The key issue was whether “cost” had a literal 
or broader meaning to reflect legislative purpose.  The taxpayer argued for 
the ordinary meaning – cost means the price that a taxpayer gave up in 
order to acquire the asset.41  The Minister argued for a broader meaning – 
the economic cost or the amount at risk.  The Minister made the following 
                                                 
37 Ibid. 
38 Shell Canada v. Canada, [1999] 3 S.C.R. 622 [Shell] at para. 45, cited in Canada 
Trustco, supra note 1 at para. 13. 
39 Canada Trustco, supra note 1 at para. 13. 
40 Ibid., at para. 16. 
41 Ibid., at para. 71. 
2007] REVIVING THE MODERN RULE 13 
 
 
 
submissions.  The object and spirit of the CCA provisions are “to provide 
for the recognition of money spent to acquire qualifying assets to the 
extent that they are consumed in the income-earning process”.42  Since 
Canada Trustco’s transaction involved no real risk, Canada Trustco did not 
actually spend $120 million to purchase the trailers, and the “cost” of $120 
million was an illusion.  Therefore, the deduction of the illusive cost 
contravened the object and spirit of the CCA provisions.43 
 
The Court was persuaded by the taxpayer’s argument.  “Textually, the 
CCA provisions use "cost" in the well-established sense of the amount 
paid to acquire the assets.”44  This textual meaning was supported by the 
statutory context (i.e., other provisions of the Act).  It was also consistent 
with the purpose of the CCA provisions, which is “to permit deduction of 
CCA based on the cost of the assets acquired.”45  How was the court 
informed of such purpose? “This purpose emerges clearly from the 
                                                 
42 Ibid., at para. 70.  The Minister relied on the reasons of Noël J.A. in Water's Edge 
Village Estates (Phase II) Ltd. v. Canada, [2003] 2 F.C. 25, 2002 FCA 291, at para. 44. 
43 Ibid., at para. 70.  The Minister’s main submission was summarized as follows: 
 
In this case, the pre-ordained series of transactions misuses and abuses the CCA 
regime because it manufactures a cost for CCA purposes that does not represent the 
real economic cost to CTMC of the trailers. CTMC borrowed $97.4 million from 
the Royal Bank, but ... the loan was effectively repaid in its entirety on the day it 
was made. The assignment by CTMC to the Bank of MAIL's rent payments under 
the lease continued the circular flow of money ... . There was no risk at all that the 
rent payments would not be made. Even the $5.9 million that CTMC apparently 
paid in fees was fully covered as it, along with the rest of CTMC's contribution of 
$24.9 million in funding, will be reimbursed when the $19 million bond pledged to 
CTMC matures in December 2005 at $33.5 million. 
 
CTMC incurred no real economic cost, and thus was not entitled to any 
"recognition for money spent to acquire qualifying assets"... . [Emphasis added] 
44 Ibid., at para. 74. 
45 Ibid.  The Court essentially stated that the purpose of the provision is to allow a 
deduction.  However, this does not answer the question as to why the deduction should be 
allowed in the first place.  Also, the Court fails to recognize that the purpose of the CCA 
provisions in general may be different than the purpose of the CCA provisions related to 
sale-leaseback transactions.   
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scheme of the CCA provisions within the Act as a whole.”46  Such purpose 
would be distorted by interpreting “cost” to mean an economic cost or 
sums of money at economic risk.  The Court wrote:47 
 
The applicable CCA provisions of the Act do not refer to economic 
risk. They refer only to "cost". Where Parliament wanted to introduce 
economic risk into the meaning of cost related to CCA provisions, it 
did so expressly, as, for instance, in s. 13(7.1) and (7.2) of the Act, 
which makes adjustments to the cost of depreciable property when a 
taxpayer receives government assistance. "Cost" in the context of 
CCA is a well-understood legal concept. It has been carefully defined 
by the Act and the jurisprudence. Like the Tax Court judge, we see 
nothing in the GAAR or the object of the CCA provisions that 
permits us to rewrite them to interpret "cost" to mean "amount 
economically at risk" in the applicable provisions. To do so would be 
to invite inconsistent results. The result would vary with the degree of 
risk in each case. This would offend the goal of the Act to provide 
sufficient certainty and predictability to permit taxpayers to 
intelligently order their affairs. For all these reasons, we agree with 
the Tax Court judge's conclusion that the "cost" was $120 million, 
not zero as argued by the appellant. 
 
In the end, the Supreme Court agreed with the Tax Court that the CCA 
deduction claimed by Canada Trustco was consistent with the object, spirit 
and purpose of the CCA provisions and thus not abusive. 
 
C. MATHEW 
 
1. THE CASE 
 
Standard Trust Company (STC) was a lender of money.  In 1991, STC 
became insolvent with $52 million in unrealized losses in a portfolio of 
mortgages.  Because of the insolvency, the losses were “useless” to STC 
                                                 
46 Ibid., at para. 74. 
47 Ibid., at para. 75. 
2007] REVIVING THE MODERN RULE 15 
 
 
 
as it had no taxable income.  In an attempt to maximize the value of those 
“assets”, a series of transactions was undertaken to enable the losses to be 
deductible by another party.  First, STC incorporated a wholly-owned 
subsidiary and entered into a partnership agreement with it (Partnership 
A).  STC contributed its mortgages to Partnership A and then sold its 
interest in the partnership to OSFC for $5 million.  STC relied on 
subsection 18(13) to transfer the portfolio of assets in Partnership A at 
their historical cost.  Partnership B was formed to acquire OSFC’s 99 
percent interest in Partnership A.  The taxpayers in this case became 
partners of Partnership B.  Partnership A liquidated its assets and realized 
the $52 million in losses.  Pursuant to subsection 96(1), the losses were 
allocated to the partners.  The taxpayers deducted their share of the losses 
from their income and reduced their tax liability.  The Minister denied the 
deduction of the losses by relying on the GAAR.  The taxpayers argued 
that the language of subsections 18(13) and 96(1) permitted the 
deductions. 
 
Unlike Canada Trustco, the taxpayers in this case did not prevail at the 
Tax Court of Canada or the Federal Court of Appeal.  This case became 
the “poster child” for GAAR-able transactions after the Supreme Court’s 
decision.  Like Canada Trustco, McLachlin C.J. and Major J. wrote the 
decision for a unanimous court. 
 
2. INTERPRETATION OF SUBSECTIONS 18(13) AND 96(1) 
 
The issue in this case was whether the transactions, that complied with the 
textual meaning of subsections 18(13) and 96(1), violated the “object, 
spirit and purpose” of these provisions. 
 
Subsection 18(13) provides, in essence, that where a taxpayer whose 
ordinary business includes the lending of money has sustained a loss on a 
disposition of property used or held in that business, the loss cannot be 
deducted by the taxpayer if the taxpayer (or a person or partnership that 
does not deal at arm’s length with the taxpayer) owned the same or 
identical property 30 days before or after the date of the disposition.  The 
amount of loss is added to the cost to the taxpayer of the substituted 
property.  In other words, subsection 18(13) is a “stop-loss” rule.  In this 
case, STC disposed of its portfolio of mortgages to Partnership A in return 
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for interest in the partnership.  The $52 million loss deduction for STC 
that would normally occur on the disposition was denied, but was added to 
the cost of the partnership interest. 
 
Subsection 96(1) provides that income or loss of a partner in a partnership 
is the partner’s share of the partnership’s income or loss.  The taxpayers 
relied on this provision to receive their share of the losses of Partnership 
B, which, in turn, received its share of the losses of Partnership A. 
 
The Court applied the textual, contextual and purposive interpretation of 
these provisions.  It noted that “[w]hile it is useful to consider the three 
elements of statutory interpretation separately to ensure each has received 
its due, they inevitably intertwine.”48 
 
In this case, the Court did not provide a clear “textual” interpretation of 
subsection 18(13) and 96(1).  Frankly, the transfer of assets by STC to 
Partnership A met the technical conditions set forth in subsection 18(13).  
The allocation of losses to the partners was required by the wording of 
subsection 96(1).  The Court already stated in Canada Trustco: “[w]here 
Parliament has specified precisely what conditions must be satisfied to 
achieve a particular result, it is reasonable to assume that Parliament 
intended that taxpayers would rely on such provisions to achieve the result 
they prescribe.”49  Therefore, it appeared that when each provision was 
interpreted separately, the textual meaning was fairly straightforward.  The 
court recognized this point:  
 
On their face, the partnership provisions found in s. 96 of the Act 
impose no restrictions on loss sharing between partners, except for 
foreign partnerships under s. 96(8). Accumulated losses are available 
to all partners, provided they entered the partnership before the end of 
the taxation year. It is agreed that the appellants claimed losses in 
proportion to their interests in Partnership B. Nevertheless, a question 
arises as to whether these provisions can apply in conjunction with s. 
                                                 
48 Mathew, supra note 2 at para. 43. 
49 Canada Trustco, supra note 1 at para. 11. 
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18(13) to allow the appellants to claim losses that originated with the 
original transferor, STC.50 
 
The Court moved quickly to the contextual and purposive interpretation.  
Indeed, there was a great deal of “intertwine” of the three elements.  Even 
under the heading of textual interpretation, the Court “intertwined” it with 
purposive interpretation:51 
 
The requirement that a partnership "not deal at arm's length with the 
taxpayer" under s. 18(13) and the partnership rules must be 
purposively construed in relation to each other and in the context of 
other provisions of the Income Tax Act that address the transfer of 
losses. 
 
How did the legislative context help clarify the meaning or purpose of 
subsection 18(13) and 96(1)? The Court first summarized the arguments 
by the parties, decisions from lower courts, and then concluded that the 
contextual interpretation was not conclusive52: 
 
The government argues that other provisions of the Act show that the 
transfer of losses to arm's length parties is generally against the 
policy of the Act. It is allowed only exceptionally in specific 
circumstances for specific purposes. The appellants counter that 
where Parliament wished to prevent the transfer of losses to arm's 
length parties, it did so explicitly, and that the absence of explicit 
prohibitions in s. 18(13) and s. 96 permits the inference that 
Parliament intended to allow such transfers. 
 
The Federal Court of Appeal … properly concluded that the general 
policy of the Income Tax Act is to prohibit the transfer of losses 
between taxpayers, subject to specific exceptions. … This policy is 
but one consideration to be taken into account in determining 
Parliament's intent with respect to s. 18(13) and s. 96. 
 
                                                 
50 Mathew, supra note 2 at para. 45. 
51 Ibid., at para. 46. 
52 Ibid., at paras. 48-50. 
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In summary, the legislative context surrounding s. 18(13) and s. 96 of 
the Income Tax Act, while perhaps not in itself conclusive, suggests 
that Parliament would not likely have intended arm's length parties to 
be able to buy losses generated by s. 18(13) transfers. 
 
The most significant aspect of the decision was the Court’s approach to 
finding legislative purpose.  First, the purpose was “implicitly” conveyed 
by the statutory text. 
 
Although, on its face, s. 96(1) imposes no restriction on the flow of 
losses to its partners, except for the treatment of foreign partnerships 
under s. 96(8), it is implicit that the rules are applied when partners in 
a partnership carry on a business in common, in a non-arm's length 
relationship.53 
 
Second, the Court saw a broader purpose from the implicit purpose:54 
 
The purpose for the broad treatment of loss sharing between partners 
is to promote an organizational structure that allows partners to carry 
on a business in common, in a non-arm's length relationship. 
 
Third, the Court relied on the explicit wording of the provision:55 
 
The purpose of s. 18(13) in particular is to prevent a taxpayer who is 
in the business of lending money from claiming a loss upon the 
superficial disposition of a mortgage or similar non-capital property. 
…  
 
Under s. 18(13), the loss is generally under the control of the 
transferor or traceable to the business of the transferor and is 
preserved because of its special relationship with the transferee 
partnership. The section in effect denies the loss to the transferor 
because it originated and remains in the transferor's control before 
and after the transfer. To allow a new arm's length partner to buy into 
                                                 
53 Ibid., at para. 51. 
54 Ibid., at para. 52. 
55 Ibid., at paras. 53-54. 
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the transferee partnership and thus to benefit from the loss would 
violate the fundamental premise underlying s. 18(13) that the loss is 
preserved because it essentially remains in the transferor's control. It 
would contradict the main purpose of s. 18(13) and the premise on 
which it operates. Section 18(13) allows the preservation and transfer 
of a loss because of the non-arm's length relationship between 
transferor and transferee. Absent that relationship, there is no reason 
for the provision to apply. [emphasis added] 
 
The Court concluded that the combined purpose of subsections 18(13) and 
96(1) is to disallow taxpayers from transferring losses to arm’s length 
parties.56 Since the taxpayers and STC were arm’s length parties, the 
deduction of STC’s losses by the taxpayers amounted to abusive tax 
avoidance.57 
 
D. REVIVING THE MODERN RULE 
 
In Canada Trustco, the Court restated the modern rule of statutory 
interpretation as the ‘textual, contextual and purposive’ approach, but 
apparently only in the GAAR context.  Among the three elements of the 
interpretation process, textual interpretation remains the most basic.  In 
Canada Trustco, the ordinary meaning of “cost” was held to be consistent 
with the context and purpose of the CCA provisions.  In Mathew, textual 
interpretation was closely intertwined, and indeed, superseded by 
contextual and purposive interpretation. 
 
On the basis of these two decisions, legislative context seems to include 
other provisions of the Act as well as the “policy”, although the latter is 
only one factor.  No extrinsic materials were cited by the Court in either 
case in establishing the legislative purpose of the specific provisions.  The 
Court relied on the text of the provisions, the legislative context 
(especially the inclusion or absence of certain provisions that may indicate 
                                                 
56 Ibid., at para. 55.  This lends support to Arnold’s argument that if the Act was 
interpreted purposively, there would be no need for the GAAR.  See Arnold, “Confusion 
Worse Confounded”, supra note 3 at 181. 
57 Ibid., at para. 58. 
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Parliament’s intent), as well as existing case law interpretation of specific 
provisions.  Extrinsic materials were referred to only in Canada Trustco in 
determining the purpose of the GAAR.58 
 
As this was the first time the Court outlined the textual, contextual and 
purposive analysis, some questions emerge from the judgment.  The first 
question is the relative weight of each element.  Although the Court stated 
that the weight of the three elements will depend on the case, the Court 
frequently stated that where the text of the provision is clear, the textual 
interpretation will be emphasized.  This raises the question as to what is a 
clear provision in the Act? Clear to whom – a tax specialist, the average 
lawyer, a layperson? The Court provided little guidance as to what a clear 
provision in the Act entails in these two cases.  Intuitively, the textual 
meaning of subsections 18(13) and 96(1) are clear.  But, the Court went 
beyond the textual meaning and looked at the context to determine the 
purpose of these provisions. 
 
Another question is the extent to which the principle of certainty, 
predictability and fairness overrides purposive interpretation.59  This 
principle was the main justification for the plain meaning approach.60  If 
the Court is more persuaded by the need for certainty and the taxpayer’s 
right to legitimate tax minimization, the scope of purposive interpretation 
is inevitably affected.  For example, in Canada Trustco, because the term 
“cost” in the context of CCA “is a well understood legal concept” which 
“has been carefully defined by the Act and the jurisprudence”, replacing it 
with “amount at economic risk” would invite inconsistencies because of 
the varying degree at risk in each case.  “This would offend the goal of the 
Act to provide sufficient certainty and predictability to permit taxpayers to 
intelligently order their affairs.”61 
 
Finally, the most challenging aspect of the revived modern rule is finding 
the “purpose” of statutory provisions.  In Canada Trustco, to the Court, 
legislative purpose “emerges clearly from the scheme of the CCA 
                                                 
58 Canada Trustco, supra note 1 at para. 15. 
59 Arnold , “Confusion Worse Confounded”,  supra note 3 at 178. 
60 Ibid., at 177. 
61 Canada Trustco, supra note 1 at para. 75. 
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provisions within the Act as a whole.”  To the government, such purpose 
was obviously not clear; otherwise they were wasting taxpayer’s money 
litigating the case.  In Mathew, the legislative purpose did not “emerge 
clearly” from the scheme of the Act and the Court relied on implicit text 
and broader policy to support its finding of the legislative purpose. 
 
 
IV. PLACER DOME – ADVANCING THE MODERN RULE 
BEYOND GAAR 
 
A. THE CASE 
 
Placer Dome is engaged in the international exploration, production and 
sale of gold.  In 1995 and 1996, the taxpayer operated mines in Ontario 
and was subject to Ontario’s Mining Tax Act.62  It realized over $17 
million in profits from hedging transactions in those two years.  The issue 
in this case was whether hedging profits were taxable under the Mining 
Tax Act.  While the definition of “hedging” and related provisions 
remained unchanged, the Minister’s administrative policy changed in 
1998: until 1998, taxable “hedging” transactions excluded those that did 
not result in the physical delivery from an Ontario mine; after 1998, the 
physical delivery of products from an Ontario mine was no longer 
required.  Placer Dome’s tax liability in 1995 and 1996 was originally 
assessed under the earlier administrative practice.  The Minister reassessed 
the taxpayer under the new practice and included the hedging profits in its 
taxable income.  The Minister argued that its new practice correctly 
interpreted the statue. 
 
Under the Mining Tax Act, mine operators pay tax based on their profit.  
According to subsection 3(5), profits are calculated by subtracting 
allowable deductions from “proceeds”.  Subsection 1(1)63 contains the 
following definition “proceeds” and “hedging”: 
                                                 
62 Mining Tax Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. M.15. 
63 Ibid., s. 1(1). 
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“proceeds” means the total consideration that is received or is 
receivable from another person or persons, in any currency, whether 
in cash or non-cash form, from the output of the mine, … and all 
consideration received or receivable from hedging and future sales or 
forward sales of the output of the mine, converted at the date of 
receipt of the consideration to the equivalent in Canadian funds, if 
receivable in funds of another country. 
 
“hedging” means the fixing of a price for output of a mine before 
delivery by means of a forward sale or a futures contract on a 
recognized commodity exchange, or the purchase or sale forward of a 
foreign currency related directly to the proceeds of the output of a 
mine, but does not include speculative currency hedging except to the 
extent that the hedging transaction determines the final price and 
proceeds for the output. 
 
The taxpayer’s appeal was dismissed by the Ontario Superior Court of 
Justice, but was allowed by the Ontario Court of Appeal.  The Minister of 
Finance appealed to the Supreme Court.  LeBel J., writing for a unanimous 
Supreme Court, allowed the appeal.  This elegantly written decision not 
only clarifies that the modern rule applies generally to the interpretation of 
tax statutes (including provincial statutes), but also provides further 
guidance on purposive interpretation. 
 
The Court cited Stubart for the general application of the modern rule to 
tax statutes.64  It then cited Canada Trustco for the emphasis of textual 
interpretation “because of the degree of precision and detail characteristic 
of many tax provisions”.65  The Court also recognized that taxpayer’s are 
entitled to rely on the clear meaning of taxation provisions in structuring 
their affairs.  It concluded that: 
 
Where such a provision admits of no ambiguity in its meaning or in 
its application to the facts, it must simply be applied.66 
                                                 
64 Placer Dome, supra note 5 at para. 21. 
65 Ibid., at para. 21. 
66 Ibid., at para. 23. 
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Was the meaning of the word “hedging” ambiguous in the context of the 
Mining Tax Act? Apparently - the government argued for a broader 
meaning to include transactions that do not involve the delivery of Ontario 
mine products, whereas the taxpayer argued for a narrower meaning, 
requiring the delivery of Ontario mine products. 
 
Following the three-element TCP approach, the Court started with the 
textual or ordinary meaning of “hedging” by referring to the Generally 
Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) and Canadian jurisprudence.  
Under GAAP, a transaction is a “hedge” where a party has assets or 
liabilities exposed to a particular financial risk and that risk is mitigated by 
the transaction.  For example, to mitigate the risk of fluctuating prices, a 
party may agree to sell a good in the future at a fixed price (a party 
looking to buy a good may enter into that transaction for the same reason).  
The court found that there are two basic categories of transactions – 
forward contracts and options.  A forward contract obligates both parties 
to complete the transaction, whereas an option gives one party the right to 
complete the transaction.  Hedging transactions typically are not settled by 
the physical delivery of goods.  Instead, they are more commonly settled 
by either cash or an offsetting contract.  For GAAP purposes, the method 
of settlement is irrelevant to the characterization of a transaction as a 
“hedge”.  Furthermore, as illustrated by Echo Bay Mines Ltd. v. Canada67, 
financial transactions not settled by physical delivery of the output of an 
Ontario mine may “fix the price” for that output and act as a hedge. 
 
The meaning of “hedging” in the statutory context was established by the 
Court by examining the statutory definition of the term, its relationship 
with the definition of “proceeds”, and the legislative history of the 
statutory definition of “hedging”.  The Court stated: 
 
It follows that "the fixing of a price for output of a mine" cannot be 
restricted to transactions that are settled by delivery of output. This is, 
in my opinion, consistent with the context of the statutory definition. 
In addition to "the fixing of a price ... by means of a forward sale", 
the definition of "hedging" refers to "the fixing of a price ... by means 
                                                 
67 [1992] 3 F.C. 707. 
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of ... a futures contract on a recognized commodity exchange", "the 
purchase or sale forward of a foreign currency related directly to the 
proceeds of the output of a mine", and "does not include speculative 
currency hedging". It is significant that futures contracts are seldom 
settled by physical delivery. Similarly, a sale or purchase forward of 
foreign currency is a separate transaction from the sale of an 
underlying commodity and would not itself be settled by physical 
delivery of the commodity. In short, the other elements in the 
statutory definition of "hedging" are consistent with the broader 
interpretation.68 
 
Therefore, the Court rejected the taxpayer’s narrow interpretation – the 
price for the output of an Ontario mine could only be “fixed” by a 
transaction that was settled physically.69  If this interpretation was 
accepted, the Court reasoned, all consideration from hedging would fall 
into the first or third component of the term “proceeds”, leaving the 
second component (all consideration from hedging) unnecessary.70  
According to the presumption against tautology, “every word in a statute 
is presumed to make sense and to have a specific role to play in advancing 
the legislative purpose.”71  Since the definition of hedging was introduced 
in the Mining Tax Act for a term that only appears once, the presumption 
against tautology carried considerable weight.72 
 
 
                                                 
68 Ibid., at para. 47. 
69 Ibid., at para. 36. 
70 Ibid., at para. 44. 
71 Ruth Sullivan, ed., Driedger on the Construction of Statutes, 3rd ed. (Toronto: 
Butterworths, 1994) cited in Placer Dome, supra note 5 at para. 45. 
72 Placer Dome, supra note 5 at para. 46.  The Court decided that the term “hedging” 
cannot be interpreted narrowly.  However, the broad interpretation does create some 
problems.  Consideration in the “proceeds” context is generally a gross amount, but 
consideration from “hedging” is a net amount.  However, this consequence, in the Court’s 
opinion, doesn’t outweigh the absurdity that would occur if “hedging” were interpreted 
narrowly: Ibid., at para. 51. 
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B. ADVANCING THE MODERN RULE 
 
The Placer Dome decision advanced the application of the modern rule in 
several respects.  First, it confirmed that TCP applies to tax statutes in 
general. 
 
Second, it provided an example of establishing a purposive meaning by 
relying on the integrity of the legislative scheme.  It gave effect to the 
interpretive presumption that “[e]very word in a statute is presumed to 
make sense and to have a specific role to play in advancing the legislative 
purpose.”73  The Court stated: 
 
To the extent that it is possible to do so, courts should avoid adopting 
interpretations that render any portion of a statute meaningless or 
redundant: Hill v. William Hill (Park Lane) Ld., [1949] A.C. 530 
(H.L.), at p. 546, per Viscount Simon.74 
 
Third, the Court adopted another important presumption in finding 
legislative intent – the presumption against absurdity.  It stated: 
 
The Mining Tax Act defines "hedging" as the fixing of a price for the 
output of a mine before delivery by means of, inter alia, a forward 
sale. Options, as Cullity J. noted, are simply contingent forward sales, 
and they fix the price for output in much the same way that forward 
contracts do. To attach substantially different tax consequences, 
within the context of a provision that taxes "proceeds from hedging" 
to two forms of transactions that serve the same function as hedging 
tools would be an absurd result that the legislature could not have 
intended.75 
 
Finally, the Court relied on evidence in rejecting the taxpayer’s argument 
for certainty and predictability, as opposed to simply “imagining” or 
“predicting” uncertainty.  The Court stated:76 
                                                 
73 Ibid., at para. 45. 
74 Ibid. 
75 Ibid., at para. 52. 
76 Ibid., at para. 50. 
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The fact that the taxpayer can and does, presumably on a principled 
basis, determine whether hedging profits relate directly to the output 
of a mine, for the purpose of claiming the resource allowance under 
the Income Tax Act and the Ontario Corporations Tax Act belies 
PDC's predictability argument. I note, in this vein, that PDC used the 
same financial information that it submitted with its tax return under 
the Mining Tax Act to claim that its hedging gains qualified as 
"resource profits" so as to entitle it to the resource allowance under 
the Corporations Tax Act. 
 
V. IMPERIAL OIL – THE MODERN RULE SPLITS THE 
COURT 
 
A. THE DECISION 
 
This case involved two corporate taxpayers – Imperial Oil and Inco.  The 
issue was whether paragraph 20(1)(f) of the Act permitted the deduction of 
foreign exchange losses incurred in the redemption of debt obligations or 
whether it is limited to the deduction of original issue discounts. 
 
Imperial Oil had issued debentures denominated in U.S. dollars.  Between 
the date of issue and the date of redemption of the debentures, the U.S. 
dollar had appreciated against the Canadian dollar.  The taxpayer suffered 
a loss on redemption of C$27.8 million representing the original discount 
and the foreign exchange loss.  Imperial Oil took the position that it was 
entitled to deduct the entire loss under subparagraph 20(1)(f)(i) of the Act.  
In the alternative, it took the position that it was entitled to a deduction 
under subparagraph 20(1)(f)(ii) and that the non-deductible 25 percent 
under that formula was by default a capital loss under subsection 39(2).  
The Minister took the position that the entire loss of C$27.8 million was 
predominantly a capital loss deductible under subsection 39(2). 
 
In 1989, Inco issued sinking fund debentures of US$150 million at a 
discount of 2.6 percent (US$ 3.9 million).  When Inco retired the 
debentures with American currency already on hand, it suffered a loss and 
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deducted it under paragraph 20(1)(f).  The Minister disallowed the 
deduction. 
 
Paragraph 20(1)(f) permits the taxpayer to deduct the amount by which the 
original issue proceeds of the debt are exceeded by the amount paid in 
satisfaction of the principal amount of the debt.  It provides that when 
computing income from business, a deduction is allowed where: 
 
(f) an amount paid in the year in satisfaction of the 
principal amount of any bond, debenture, … issued by the 
taxpayer … on which interest was stipulated to be payable, 
to the extent that the amount so paid does not exceed, 
 
(i) in any case where the obligation was issued for 
an amount not less than 97% of its principal 
amount, and the yield from the obligation … does 
not exceed 4/3 of the interest stipulated to be 
payable on the obligation, … the amount by which 
the lesser of the principal amount of the obligation 
and all amounts paid in the year or in any preceding 
year in satisfaction of its principal amount exceeds 
the amount for which the obligation was issued,  
 
and 
 
(ii) in any other case, ¾ of the lesser of the amount so paid 
and the amount by which the lesser of the principal amount 
of the obligation and all amounts paid in the year or in any 
proceeding taxation year in satisfaction of its principal 
amount exceeds the amount for which the obligation was 
issued. 
 
The issue in this case was whether the deduction under paragraph 20(1)(f) 
is limited to a “discount” arising from the original issuance of the debt, or 
is it broad enough to include costs related to borrowing in a foreign 
currency (such as foreign exchange losses)? 
 
The Minister argued for a narrow interpretation.  According to the 
Minister, foreign exchange losses are not addressed by paragraph 20(1)(f).  
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The exchange rate applicable to the calculation of the principal amount is 
an amount in Canadian dollars, fixed on the date of issue.  If the exchange 
rate is fixed on the issue date, then no discount due to foreign exchange 
losses can exist.  Since no other specific provision would apply, subsection 
39(2) – a residual provision – would apply, treating the foreign exchange 
losses as capital losses.  The Minister’s position relied on determining 
Parliament’s intent, by examining intrinsic and extrinsic evidence. 
 
The taxpayers argued that paragraph 20(1)(f) allows for the deduction of 
foreign exchange losses.  They argued that when an obligation is issued in 
foreign currency, the principal amount is fixed on the date of disposition.  
This would allow the fluctuation of the currency to create foreign 
exchange gains or losses to expand or reduce the discount deductible 
under the paragraph.  The taxpayers relied on determining the purpose of 
paragraph 20(1)(f) by examining the definition of “principal amount” in 
subsection 248(1) and how that expression is used in other provisions of 
the Act. 
 
The Supreme Court was split four to three.77  LeBel J. wrote the majority 
decision and Binnie J. authored the dissenting judgment. 
 
In the GAAR cases, the goal of the interpretive exercise is to establish the 
“object, spirit and purpose” of a statutory provision in order to determine 
if that object, spirit and purpose is abused.  In non-GAAR cases, such as 
this case, the statutory text, context and scheme are used as evidence of 
finding legislative intent or purpose.  The legislative intent or purpose is 
then used to illuminate which textual interpretation is more compatible 
with such intent or purpose. 
 
 
 
                                                 
77 The Tax Court of Canada allowed Imperial Oil’s appeal in part – allowing a partial 
deduction.  The Federal Court of Appeal also allowed Imperial Oil’s appeal in part, 
allowing a greater deduction than the Tax Court.  The Tax Court of Canada dismissed 
Inco’s appeal.  The Federal Court of Appeal allowed Inco’s appeal based on its decision 
in Imperial Oil. 
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B. THE MAJORITY 
 
LeBel J. reiterated the general principles governing the interpretation of 
the Act.78  He emphasized that “[w]hether foreign exchange losses are 
covered by s. 20(1)(f) must be ascertained with respect to the text, scheme 
and context of that provision.”79 
 
Looking at the text of paragraph 20(1)(f), LeBel J. noted that the word 
“discount” was absent and there was no express mention of foreign 
currency exchanges.  However, the opening words of subparagraph 
20(1)(f)(i) set out what is commonly accepted as the definition of a 
discount.  The text of this provision thus suggested that the “primary 
referent of s. 20(1)(f) is something other than foreign exchange losses, 
namely, payments in the nature of discounts.”80  When the provision was 
applied to Canadian dollar obligations, paragraph 20(1)(f) isolated the 
difference between the principal amount of the obligation and the amount 
for which it was issued – the discount.  When the difference is three 
percent or less, the discount is fully deductible under subparagraph 
20(1)(f)(i) and when it is greater than three percent, it is deductible at the 
capital rate under subparagraph 20(1)(f)(ii).81  Therefore, when applied to 
Canadian dollar obligations, each branch has a clear application and 
applies to all original issue discounts.  LeBel J. concluded that the 
deduction in paragraph 20(1)(f) “does not encompass the appreciation or 
depreciation of the principal amount over time.”82 
 
LeBel J. examined whether in the context of debts issued in foreign 
currency, does the wording in paragraph 20(1)(f) permit the deduction of 
foreign exchange losses? Subparagraph 20(1)(f)(i) applied “in any case 
where the obligation was issued for an amount not less than 97 percent of 
its principal amount”, while subparagraph 20(1)(f)(ii) applied “in any 
                                                 
78 Imperial Oil, supra note 6 at para. 27. 
79 Ibid., at para. 61. 
80 Ibid., at para. 62. 
81 Ibid. 
82 Ibid.  He agreed with Miller J. in Imperial Oil Limited v. Canada, [2004] 2 C.T.C. 
3030, 2004 TCC 207 at para. 44. 
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other case”.  This led to the question does the phrase “in any other case” in 
subparagraph 20(1)(f)(ii) refer to “any case in which the obligation was 
issued for an amount less than 97 percent” or to “any case in which the 
cost of repaying the principal amount exceeds the amount for which the 
debt was issued”?  The taxpayers argued the latter.  LeBel J. opined that 
the “better reading of the opening words of s. 20(1)(f)(ii) is the one that 
preserves a higher degree of parallelism of expression (i.e., 'any case in 
which the obligation was issued for an amount less than 97%').”83  In other 
words, paragraph 20(1)(f) addressed the deductibility of original issue 
discounts. 
 
LeBel J. recognized that the calculation of a “discount” is based on the 
“principal amount”.  If the principal amount of debt is issued in a foreign 
currency that can fluctuate, with the cost of repayment in Canadian 
dollars, then the discount amount may encompass discounts arising out of 
fluctuations of the currency over time.84  This led to another question: does 
the statutory definition of “principal amount” in subsection 248(1) 
contemplate the possibility that the principal amount can be the amount 
payable in Canadian currency at the time of issue or the time of 
redemption.  If it is the latter, foreign exchange losses would be included.  
To resolve this ambiguity, LeBel J. found it necessary to determine 
whether Parliament intended foreign exchange losses to be covered by 
paragraph 20(1)(f) in the same way as discounts.85 
 
                                                 
83 Ibid., at para. 64.  This statement reflects a presumption against internal inconsistency 
or self-defeating.  The Presumption states that courts should not presume that Parliament 
intended to allow taxpayers to defeat its intention through contrived, artificial 
transactions.  See Jinyan Li, ““Economic Substance”: Legitimate Tax Minimization vs. 
Abusive Tax Avoidance” (2006) 54 Can. Tax. J. 23 at 39.  In this case, this reading of 
paragraph 20(1)(f) would not defeat Parliament intention of having foreign exchange 
losses as part of the capital regime, instead of the income regime.   
84 Ibid., at para. 64.  LeBel J. states “the 'discount amount' can be ascertained in relation 
to the value of the principal in Canadian dollars at the time of repayment, rather than in 
relation to the face value of the obligation (i.e., the term 'discount' may not be limited to 
'original issue discounts' but may encompass discounts that arise out of fluctuations of 
commodity or currency prices over time).” 
85 Ibid., at para. 64. 
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In LeBel’s view, “s. 20(1)(f) was never intended to apply to foreign 
exchange losses.”86  He gave the following reasons for his conclusion: 
 
First, the scheme of subsection 20(1) indicates that only expenses arising 
directly out of the borrower-lender relationship are deductible because 
other costs enumerated in s. 20 are intrinsic costs of borrowing, such as 
interest payments and premiums.  Since a foreign exchange loss “is a cost 
of borrowing only where the thing borrowed is foreign currency”, it is not 
an intrinsic cost of borrowing, and thus not deductible. 
 
Second, an interpretation of paragraph 20(1)(f) that allows the deduction 
of foreign exchange losses means that this section “would operate quite 
differently in relation to obligations denominated in foreign currency than 
it does in relation to obligations denominated in Canadian dollars.”87  
 
In the context of foreign currency obligations, the deduction would 
reflect the appreciation or depreciation of the principal amount over 
time, whereas in the context of Canadian dollar obligations, the 
deduction would reflect a point-in-time expense. In the context of 
foreign currency obligations, the s. 20(1)(f) deduction would 
accordingly be available even where, as in Inco, there was no original 
issue discount.  [This] approach also has the effect of altering the 
distinction between the two branches of s. 20(1)(f). 88 
 
Therefore, Parliament could not have intended such a differential tax 
treatment as it would create incentives to structure obligations in a 
particular way. 
 
Third, the broader context of the Act, such as subsection 39(2), sheds light 
on legislative intent.  If paragraph 20(1)(f) is interpreted to allow a 
deduction of foreign exchange losses, which have been traditionally 
characterized as on account of capital,89 it would create conflicts with the 
                                                 
86 Ibid., at para. 67. 
87 Ibid., at para. 66. 
88 Ibid. 
89 Ibid., at para. 32.  The majority identified that borrowing is characterized as a payment 
on account of capital because the characterization of a foreign exchange gain or loss 
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general scheme of the Act treating capital gains and losses separately.  
More specifically, it would fail to “properly appreciate the role of s. 39”, 
which was a “statement of Parliament's intent to treat foreign exchange 
losses as capital losses.”90 
 
Fourth, the broad statement that “Parliament encourages companies to 
raise capital by allowing them to deduct virtually all costs of borrowing 
under the provisions of s. 20(1)”91 was not persuasive.  Paragraph 
18(1)(b), for example, provides that payments on account of capital may 
not be deducted from business income unless the deduction thereof is 
expressly permitted.  Therefore, not all costs of borrowing are deductible 
under paragraph 20(1)(f). 
 
Ultimately, LeBel rejected the taxpayer’s argument.  He stated:92 
 
[It] turns s. 20(1)(f) into a broad provision allowing for the 
deductibility of a wide range of costs attendant upon financing in 
foreign currency, in the absence of any mention of such costs in the 
text of the ITA, and despite the fact that such costs are usually 
regarded as being on capital account. 
 
C. THE DISSENT 
 
Binnie J. agreed with LeBel J. that paragraph 20(1)(f) should be 
interpreted textually, contextually and purposively.93  However, he 
emphasized more of a textual interpretation by vividly describing the 
provisions of the Act as the “rules of engagement” for the “battlefield on 
which over 21 million Canadian taxpayers engage with the Minister of 
                                                                                                                         
generally follows the characterization of the underlying transaction.  This is important 
because paragraph 18(1)(b) prohibits the deduction of amounts paid on account of capital 
unless it is specifically allowed by another section. 
90 Ibid., at para. 68. 
91 Ibid., at para. 65. 
92 Ibid., at para. 67. 
93 Ibid., at para. 75. 
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National Revenue.”94  He also indicated his discomfort with relying on 
legislative intent and his preference for legislative purpose. In the end, he 
agreed with the taxpayers and held that foreign exchange losses are 
deductible.  
  
Binnie J.’s textual interpretation began with the recognition of the role of 
section 20 being a specific provision to allow the deduction of “various 
capital amounts” to override paragraph 18(1)(b). As such, he recognized 
that the foreign exchange losses were on account of capital and could only 
be deductible against income by virtue of section 20. He found that this 
provision “permits a deduction of the amount by which the original issue 
proceeds of the debt are exceeded by the amount paid in satisfaction of the 
principal amount of the debt.”95 
 
He then noted that the expression "principal amount" was used nine times 
in the course of paragraph 20(1)(f), signalling its importance. “Principal 
amount” is defined in subsection 248(1) to mean the amount that “is the 
maximum amount or maximum total amount, as the case may be, payable 
on account of the obligation by the issuer”.  In the context of debt issued 
in a foreign currency, since Canadian dollars must be used for the 
purposes of the Act, the maximum amount payable can only be 
determined on the date of redemption, not the date of the issuance of the 
debt.96  Thus, the relevant exchange rate is the rate prevailing at the date of 
redemption. “It is not until that date that it is possible to determine the 
"maximum amount …  payable on account of the obligation" as required 
by the statutory definition of "principal amount".97  
 
Binnie J. cited a number of instances where the Minister has allowed 
deductions under paragraph 20(1)(f) for obligations other than those with 
original issue discounts.98  He stated that in those cases, the “principal 
amount” could not be calculated until the date of repayment that the actual 
                                                 
94 Ibid., at para. 73. 
95 Ibid., at para. 83. 
96 Ibid., at para. 85. 
97 Ibid., at para. 83. 
98 Ibid., at paras. 88-92. 
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cost of satisfying the obligation could be ascertained in Canadian dollars.99 
Binnie J. also considered foreign exchange losses as a cost that arises 
directly out of the debtor-creditor relationship.100  
 
Textually interpreted, Binnie J. concluded that paragraph 20(1)(f) allows 
the deduction of the discounts computed by comparing the total principal 
amount fixed on the date of redemption and the original proceeds of 
issuance.   
 
The broader statutory context, including subsection 39(2), section 79 and 
section 80, was not considered helpful. Subsection 39(2) is a residual 
provision and applies only to the extent that a foreign currency loss is not 
otherwise deductible in computing income.101  He also noted that sections 
79 and 80 specifically state that the calculation is to be based on the value 
of the foreign debt in Canadian currency on the issuance date. There is no 
such specification in paragraph 20(1)(f). Therefore, “there is little help to 
be had from other sections of the Act.”102 
 
On the last part of the interpretative process, Binnie J. disagreed with 
LeBel J.’s conclusion that paragraph 20(1)(f) is designed to address a 
specific class of financing costs arising out of the issuance of debt 
instruments at a discount. 
 
D. BASIS FOR THE SPLIT 
 
The majority and the dissent followed the same principle of statutory 
interpretation and the same process of textual, contextual and purposive 
interpretation, but reached different interpretations of paragraph 20(1)(f). 
They seem to differ on several issues discussed below.  
 
                                                 
99 Ibid., at para. 92. 
100 Ibid., at para. 79. 
101 Ibid., at para. 99. 
102 Ibid., at para 101. 
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1. NOT ALL WORDS ARE EQUAL IN THE TEXTUAL INTERPRETATION 
 
The Court put a different emphasis on different elements of the statutory 
text.   According to LeBel J., the opening words of subparagraph 
20(1)(f)(i) set out what is commonly accepted as the definition of a 
discount.103  Also, there is no express mention of a foreign currency 
exchange. In interpreting the term “principal amount”, LeBel J. referred to 
the statutory definition in subsection 248(1), but found it inconclusive as it 
“does not expressly address whether or how foreign currency fluctuations 
are to be taken into account in determining the "principal amount" of an 
obligation denominated in foreign currency” and there was no indication 
that “foreign currency conversions were in Parliament's contemplation 
when that section was drafted.”104 
 
On the other hand, Binnie J. emphasized the term “principal amount”, 
apparently because it is used nine times in paragraph 20(1)(f).  He noted 
that the definition of “principal amount” is the maximum amount or 
maximum total amount payable on account of the obligation by the issuer.  
In the case of a foreign issue obligation that contracts the issuer to pay 
foreign currency at a future date, the maximum amount actually payable 
on account of the obligation is unknown and unknowable at the time of 
issuance and can only be ascertained at the date fixed for redemption.105 
Binnie J. did not examine the meaning of other words used in paragraph 
20(1)(f).  
 
2. LEGISLATIVE SCHEME 
 
The scheme of the Act is important under the modern rule, which 
specifically requires that the meaning of the statutory words be “in their 
grammatical and ordinary sense harmoniously with the scheme of the Act, 
the object of the Act, and the intention of Parliament".  In Canada Trustco, 
the Court seemed to have collapsed the “scheme” element into either 
                                                 
103 Ibid., at para. 62. 
104 Ibid., at para. 61. 
105 Ibid., at para. 86. 
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“context” or “purposive” element of the rephrased “textual, contextual and 
purposive” approach. The Court emphasized in Canada Trustco that: 
 
The relative effects of ordinary meaning, context and purpose on the 
interpretive process may vary, but in all cases the court must seek to 
read the provisions of an Act as a harmonious whole. 106 
 
The phrase “the provisions of an Act as a harmonious whole” expresses 
the idea of “legislative scheme”. Therefore, legislative scheme is an 
important element of statutory interpretation.   
 
LeBel J. specifically referred to the “scheme” of subsection 20(1) as one 
factor in rejecting the taxpayers’ argument. The scheme allows a 
deduction for intrinsic cost of borrowing and foreign exchange loss is not 
such a cost. In his opinion, “the scheme of s. 20, although not dispositive, 
does not assist the respondent.”  
 
LeBel J. also appreciated the fact that the Act has separate schemes for 
capital gains and losses and income gains and losses: 
 
Despite its undeniable - and growing - complexity, the current federal 
ITA displays some fundamental structural characteristics. One of 
these characteristics, which is provided for in s. 3, is the distinction 
between income and capital. Capital gains are only partially brought 
into income for taxation purposes.107 
 
Because subsection 20(1) is part of the income regime, allowing 
deductions against income, only capital amounts that are specified under 
subsection 20(1) (such as interest and capital cost allowance) are 
deductible. Permitting a deduction for foreign exchange losses, which are 
on capital account, in the absence of expressed authorization under 
subsection 20(1), lead to “conflicts with the general treatment of capital 
gains and losses in the ITA.” LeBel J. correctly stated that the taxpayer’s 
argument (which was accepted by Binnie J.) “indicates a failure to 
                                                 
106 Canada Trustco, supra note 1 at para. 10. 
107 Imperial Oil, supra note 6 at para. 17. 
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properly appreciate the role of s. 39”, which is a statement of Parliament's 
intent to treat foreign exchange losses as capital losses.”108 
 
Binnie J. did not mention the legislative scheme at all. To him, section 39 
was of little relevance.109 His failure to properly appreciate the separate 
regime for income and capital is clearly demonstrated by his following 
remarks: 110 
 
It all comes back to the simple proposition that in Canadian tax terms 
foreign currency is a commodity, and its fluctuations will inevitably 
carry costs (or benefits). Had the Canadian dollar appreciated against 
the U.S. dollar in the relevant period of time, for instance, the 
taxpayers would have lost the original issue discount to which they 
might otherwise have been entitled. What the taxing authority loses 
on the swings it will make up on the roundabouts. At the end of the 
day it will have its just desserts. 
 
Binnie J.’s statement is incorrect. Foreign exchange gains and losses are 
generally on capital account to Imperial Oil, Inco, and other taxpayers 
who are not currency traders. As such, capital expenditures are not 
deductible in the absence of a specific provision under section 20. Even if 
paragraph 20(1)(f) was interpreted to allow a deduction for foreign 
exchange losses, there is no equivalent provision to tax foreign exchange 
gains as income. Therefore, foreign exchange gains are not the “just 
desserts” to offset the deduction for foreign exchange losses. While 
taxpayers will argue for a full deduction for the loss under paragraph 
20(1)(f), they will surely not argue for full inclusion of the gain. Instead, 
foreign exchange gains will be treated on capital account, partially 
taxable.111 The differential treatment of full deduction for the loss and 
partial inclusion for the gain can be appreciated only when one appreciates 
the scheme of the Act.   
                                                 
108 Ibid., at para. 68. 
109 Ibid., at para. 99. 
110 Ibid., at para. 104. 
111 This is what happened in Shell Canada where the taxpayer deducted the interest at full 
nominal rate for a weak-currency loan and included the foreign exchange gains from a 
related forward contract as capital gains.  
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3. LEGISLATIVE INTENT OR PURPOSE 
 
In previous cases, the Court was not clear in referring to “purpose” or 
“intent” and tended to use them interchangeably.  In Imperial Oil, LeBel J. 
seemed to emphasize legislative intent, whereas Binnie J. favored 
legislative purpose.  
 
LeBel J. concluded that the text, context and scheme of the Act indicate 
that Parliament did not intend to allow a deduction for foreign exchange 
losses when enacting s.20(1)(f). 112  He noted that the taxpayers argued 
that the purpose of paragraph 20(1)(f) was to encourage Canadian 
companies to raise capital on the global market, but did not rely on it to 
displace the legislative intent.  In Binnie J.’s view, such legislative intent 
was unexpressed in specific words of the Act and should not be used to 
override clear textual meaning.  Moreover, Binnie J. found that LeBel J.’s 
interpretation of paragraph 20(1)(f) would defeat the legislative purpose.  
Only a broader interpretation of paragraph 20(1)(f) would be consistent 
with such purpose.  
 
While LeBel J. found legislative intent on the basis of the text and scheme 
of the Act, it is unclear as to the basis used by Binnie J. in establishing the 
legislative purpose.  He referred to the legislative history of some of the 
deductions113 under subsection 20(1), but not paragraph 20(1)(f) per se.114  
The path for finding legislative purpose is not clear.  
 
The overall logic for Binnie J.’s reliance on “legislative purpose” as 
opposed to legislative intent is problematic.  Binnie J. offered two reasons 
for rejecting legislative intent.  First, Parliament’s intent “is nowhere 
                                                 
112 Ibid., at para. 67. 
113 In Montreal Coke and Manufacturing v. Minister of National Revenue, [1944] A.C. 
126 (P.C.). 1942, the Supreme Court held that the costs incurred in refinancing a 
company’s debt are not deductible against revenue for the purpose of calculating income 
tax. In response to this, Parliament enacted a series of provisions to deem various costs of 
capital borrowings to be deductible because they recognized that capital borrowings are 
used to productively generate income.  
114 Imperial Oil, supra note 6 at para. 104. 
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expressed in the Act, although it would have been a simple thing to say so 
if that was Parliament's intent.”  He provided no examples where 
Parliament’s intent is expressed in the Act.  Second, “finding unexpressed 
legislative intentions under the guise of purposive interpretation runs the 
risk of upsetting the balance Parliament has attempted to strike in the 
Act.”115  
 
While troubled by relying on unexpressed legislative intent, Binnie J. was 
not worried at all about the unexpressed legislative purpose.  Instead, he 
agreed with LeBel J.’s observation that "Parliament encourages companies 
to raise capital by allowing them to deduct virtually all costs of borrowing 
under the provisions of s. 20(1)".  Naturally, allowing the deduction of 
foreign exchange losses advance such purpose.  Denying the deduction 
would act as a deterrent.  Furthermore, given the modest size of the 
Canadian capital market,116 “it would be counterproductive in a global 
economy to discourage foreign borrowings.”117  Binnie J. did not apply his 
criticism of legislative intent to his own approach: how would such 
purposive interpretation of paragraph 20(1)(f) preserve “the balance 
Parliament has attempted to strike in the Act”? What is the “balance” in 
the first place?  
 
The way that Binnie J. pit “legislative intent” against “legislative purpose” 
is unfortunate.  Many provisions in the Act originate from the 1917 Act or 
subsequent amendments.  Given the change in the complexity of business 
today and the sophistication of tax advisors, it is likely that these 
provisions are used in ways that Parliament never intended.118  Perhaps out 
of this concern, LeBel J. did not see legislative intent and purpose to be 
mutually exclusive. In the same paragraph of his decision, he used both 
terms:  
 
                                                 
115 Shell, supra note 38 at para. 43, cited Imperial Oil, supra note 6 at para. 102. 
116 Imperial Oil, supra note 6, para.70. 
117 Ibid., at para. 103. 
118 The fact that these provisions haven’t been modified is not conclusive either since 
either Parliament sees no need to amend the provision or that they didn’t foresee that the 
provision could be used in that manner. 
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This interpretation best reflects the structure of the ITA and the intent 
of Parliament. The purpose of the provision is to address a specific 
class of financing costs arising out of the issuance of debt instruments 
at a discount. 119  
 
VI. THE BABY STEPS 
 
The four decisions reviewed in this article indicate that the Court is 
prepared to slowly move away from the plain meaning approach towards a 
“textual, contextual and purposive” approach or the modern rule. In our 
view, the move is in the right direction, but the steps taken are merely 
“baby steps”.  The Court has yet to provide adequate details on the 
implementation of the new approach.  
 
On the general principle of statutory interpretation, the Court has revived 
the modern rule on a timid, hesitant and unsteady footing. In each of the 
four cases, the Court emphasized the importance of textual interpretation 
following the citation of the modern rule. It could be viewed as continuing 
the plain meaning approach.120 The Court also qualified the modern rule 
with the principle of certainty, predictability and fairness and the respect 
for the right of taxpayers’ to legitimate tax minimization. Nonetheless, the 
Court has taken the first step in moving beyond pure textual interpretation. 
In none of the four cases did the Court refuse to examine the context and 
purpose of the statutory provisions. In Placer Dome and Imperial Oil, 
LeBel J. did not accept the argument that the long-standing administrative 
position be adopted, even if such position was used and relied upon by 
taxpayers.  Even Binnie J. did not reject an examination of legislative 
purpose in Imperial Oil, even though he limited the utility of such 
examination to reveal latent ambiguity in the statutory text. 121   
 
                                                 
119 Imperial Oil, supra note 6 at para. 67. 
120 See Arnold, “Confusion Worse Confounded”, supra note 14 at 683.  Arnold argues 
that the TCP approach in Canada Trustco and Placer Dome is nothing more than the 
plain meaning approach. 
121 Imperial Oil, supra note 6 at para. 97. 
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The relative weight of text, context, and purpose in the interpretation 
analysis depends on the case. Generally speaking, however, as mentioned 
above, more weight is given to the text when the provision is written 
specifically. This provides little guidance because determining when a 
provision in a taxing statute is written specifically is a subjective 
assessment. Moreover, as illustrated in the Imperial Oil case, different 
judges may emphasize different elements of the text.  
 
The most under-developed element of the TCP approach is legislative 
purpose. The dominant view seems to be that legislative purpose and 
intent can be referred to interchangeably. However, in Imperial Oil, a 
strong dissent pit “purpose” against “intent” and rejected the latter for very 
persuasive reasons. The basis and process for establishing legislative 
intent or purpose have yet to be coherently and comprehensively 
articulated. Clearly, little guidance can be found in the following 
statements:  
 
The purpose of CCA provisions emerges clearly.122 
 
The purpose for the broad treatment of loss sharing between partners 
is to promote an organizational structure that allows partners to carry 
on a business in common, in a non-arm's length relationship”123  
 
Parliament encourages companies to raise capital by allowing them to 
deduct virtually all costs of borrowing under the provisions of s. 
20(1).124  
 
It is difficult to imagine that a litigant in a tax case can argue the purpose 
or intent of a statutory provision without referring to any extrinsic 
materials or scheme of the Act. LeBel J.’s approach to purposive analysis 
in Placer Dome and Imperial Oil is thus far the most sophisticated. He 
referred to the text, legislative scheme and structure, interpretive 
presumptions, and some extrinsic materials.  
                                                 
122 Canada Trustco, supra note 1 at para. 74.  The Tax Court did a better job in purposive 
analysis. See 2003 TCC 215 at paras. 59-68. 
123 Mathew, supra note 2 at para. 52. 
124 Imperial Oil, supra note 6 at paras 67 and 103. 
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VII. MOVING FORWARD 
 
A. GREEN-LIGHT ON 
 
Applying the modern rule to the interpretation of a complex statute such as 
the Act is inherently difficult.125  The provisions of taxing statutes are 
difficult to interpret because of they are technical, detailed and drafted in a 
specific manner.  The meaning and purpose of a specific provision may be 
well-hidden in the quagmire of rules. The Court has traditionally wanted 
as little a role as possible in the making of tax law.126  They may not want 
to stray into what appears to be creation of new rules that Parliament 
might have introduced had it thought about it but which, in fact, it did 
not.127  This conservative attitude has kept the courts from becoming a co-
operative law-making partner of Parliament in the tax law sphere.128  
 
There are reasons to be optimistic about the Court’s moving forward with 
applying the modern rule in the interpretation of the Act. First, within a 
two-year time period, the Court first adopted the modern rule in Canada 
Trustco and Mathew in the GAAR context, then expanded it in Placer 
Dome and Imperial Oil to tax statutes in general. The momentum has been 
extremely impressive. The level of sophistication in applying the modern 
rule, although far from satisfactory, has improved greatly from Canada 
Trustco to Imperial Oil.  
 
Second, it would be difficult to revert back to plain meaning approach 
because of the GAAR. As the Court correctly recognized, the GAAR 
                                                 
125 For further discussion, see Hogg, Magee and Li, Principles of Canadian Income Tax 
Law (6th edition) (2007), ch.19. 
126 See e.g. Shell, supra note 38. 
127 Judith Freedman, “Converging Tracks? Recent Developments in Canadian and UK 
Approaches to Tax Avoidance” (2005) 53 Can. Tax. J. 1038. 
128 See Neil Brooks, “The Responsibility of Judges in Interpreting Tax Legislation” in 
Graeme S. Cooper, ed., Tax Avoidance and the Rule of Law (Amsterdam: IBFD 
Publications in association with the Australian Tax Research Foundation, 1997).    
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demands a purposive interpretation. Since the GAAR is potentially 
applicable to many provisions of the Act, it would be very odd to switch 
the interpretative approach depending on whether GAAR is invoked. It is 
time that the Court treats tax statutes like other statutes and apply the 
modern rule. In a sense, the GAAR has the effect of being a general rule of 
statutory interpretation.129  It would be difficult for judges to fall back on 
the strict interpretation or plain meaning with GAAR in the Act. With the 
departure of Iaccobucci J., the main author of the decisions advocating the 
plain meaning approach,130 Binnie J. may champion the more textual 
interpretive approach, but he is surely mindful of the need to look at the 
legislative purpose.  Also, it will be interesting to see which approach 
Rothstein J., who authored some important tax decisions while on the 
Federal Court of Appeal131, will support. 
  
Third, the Court sent a strong signal about the revival of the modern rule. 
The decisions in Canada Trustco, Mathew and Placer Dome are 
unanimous, and the Chief Justice co-authored the first two decisions, and 
concurred with LeBel J. in Placer Dome and Imperial Oil. However, the 
four to three split in Imperial Oil is worrisome because the rationale used 
by Binnie J. would represent a step back from purposive interpretation.132 
 
Finally, LeBel J.’s decisions in Placer Dome and Imperial Oil serve as 
good precedents. His reference to the statutory text, scheme and structure, 
as well as interpretative aids in interpretation is refreshing and 
illuminating.  
 
                                                 
129 This then calls into question the continuing need for the GAAR.  See supra  note 56. 
130 See Duff (2007),  supra note 14. 
131 See e.g. OSFC Holdings Ltd. v. R, [2001] 4 C.T.C. 82, 2001 D.T.C. 5471 (F.C.A.); 
722540 Ontario Inc. [Novopharm Limited] v. R, [2003] 3 C.T.C. 1, 2003 D.T.C. 5195 
(F.C.A.); Canadian Pacific Limited v. R, [2002] 2 C.T.C. 197, 2002 D.T.C. 6742 
(F.C.A.). 
132 The fact that Binnie J. was supported by two members of the Court would suggest that 
a return to the plain meaning approach, or some other label to a strict approach, is 
possible. However, Binnie J’s position may be affected by the particular facts of the case, 
including the fact that the Minister’s administrative practice seemed to support the 
taxpayer’s argument.  
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B. SUGGESTED MOVES 
 
In order to move beyond baby steps in interpreting the Act according to 
the modern rule, the courts should assume that the meaning of the 
statutory words is ambiguous and engage in contextual and purposive 
analysis. It would be unfortunate if the courts continue to find “clear and 
plain” meaning when equally talented and devoted lawyers representing 
the taxpayer and the government disagree on the meaning of the same 
words.  
 
Moreover, the courts should not view the Act just as the rules of 
engagement for the “battlefield” between taxpayers and the government. 
The Act is a huge government spending statute and a tool of redistribution 
and social justice. As early as 1984, Estey J. recognized the changing role 
of the Act and used it as an impetus for the initial adoption of the modern 
rule. Surely, today’s Court can see the multiple roles of the Act more 
clearly and further implement the modern rule.  
 
The Court should assume a more active role in tax law-making through 
interpretation. It should seriously consider the presumptions, including 
presumption against tautology, presumption against absurd results, and 
against self-defeating or internal inconsistency, as important canons of 
statutory interpretation. Of course, lawyers need to help the court with 
evidence of statutory scheme and extrinsic materials.     
 
 
 
